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1. INTRODUCTION 
In [53 Smale considers a repeated game with bounded memory. In his model, the players 
only keep some kind of average of the past outcomes in their memory, and decisions are 
based on this memory. Thus, one has a dynamics on the outcome space of this game, 
depending on players’ memory strategies. A stationary point of this dynamics is called 
a solution of this game. Stability considerations about these solutions arise naturally in 
this setting. 
Nash solutions for a game with memory are defined in [5], which include the ordinary 
Nash solutions for the same game. It is proved that they are also Nash equilibria con- 
sidered as an extended solution for the associated supergame. The first order necessary 
condition for Nash solutions is also obtained via the use of a kind of calculus of variations. 
In this paper, we investigate the following three general questions and a concrete 
model example: 
(1) Study first necessary conditions and second sufficient conditions for (local) Nash 
solutions. 
(2) Describe the game with memory strategies from a generic viewpoint. 
(3) Determine the payoff vectors associated to those Nash solutions. 
(4) Analyze the continuous prisoner’s dilemma in detail. 
The results of this paper provide satisfactory or nice answers to the above problems. 
Roughly speaking, we obtain the following: 
(1) 
(2) 
(3) 
(4) 
First and second order conditions for (local) Nash solutions are found in the sense 
that they depend only on first and second derivatives of payoff functions and mem- 
ory strategies at that solution (see Theorems 1, 2). 
Generically, interior local Nash solutions will occur as isolated points for M- 
parameter families of memory strategies, and they satisfy a strong second order 
condition. Here m is the dimension of the action space (see Theorem 3). 
The payoff vectors to Nash solutions are essentially the individually rational pay- 
offs. Thus, we still have some sort of “cooperative” outcomes. There also exists 
a game with memory without any Nash solutions (see Theorems 4, 5). 
We illustrate the above results through the continuous prisoner’s dilemma. The 
values of Nash solutions of this game are completely determined. A class of 
“good” strategies is also obtained (see Theorems 6, 7, 7’). 
From its very definition, Nash solutions are optimal solutions for a problem in a 
suitable functional space. However, a simple but crucial observation, which leads to neat 
answers to the above problems, is that Nash solutions can be regarded as optimal solu- 
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tions for a problem in a finite dimensional space (cf. Proposition 1). Thus, applying’the 
Kuhn-Tucker theorem in mathematical programming to that finite-dimensional optimi- 
zation problem, one solves problem (1). Applying methods from singularities of mappings 
to that finite-dimensional problem similar to those in Wan [6], one answers problem (2). 
Again, the finite-dimensional criteria together with Brouwer’s fixed point theorem provide 
nice results for problem (3). 
This paper is arranged as follows: Sec. 2 presents the model as introduced by Smale 
in 151. The key observation and its immediate consequence are given in Sec. 3. Generic 
results are described in Sec. 4, while some of its proof is in the appendices. Section 5 
gives the statements and proofs of two results of values of Nash solutions. In the last 
section, the “continuous prisoner’s dilemma” is examined in detail. 
2. THE MODEL 
First, let us recall the familiar setting of a game in normal form with n players (see 
[3, 51). 
Let the action space Ai for the ith players be a region in the Cartesian space R”’ of 
dimension mi, and the outcome space X a convex subset in R”. A game in normal form 
with n players is a triple (A, 7~, X), where A is the product 
and P is a function of class Cp (p = 0,. . . , ~0) for some p from A into X. The space A, 
the function r are called the action space, the payoff function of the game, respectively. 
Now, let us consider the repeated game with bounded memory. 
Following Smale 151, an averaging process { gT: XT --, X, T = 1, 2, . . . } satisfying the 
strong version of the main axiom and the divergence condition is postulated. Here, 
XT = {(Xl, * * . ,x,.)/x1 E X, i = 1, . . . ,T} 
denotes the space of the history of the outcomes up to time T. A (bounded) memory 
strategy for the ith players is defined as a C” map s{: X + A i. Thus, he or she will take 
the action s&r) if the average outcome for the past is x. Because all the concepts, which 
will be investigated, can be defined independently of any averaging process involved. For 
simplicity, we shah not state the main axiom and the divergence condition on averaging 
processes here. 
Let s = (sl, . . . A), where each si is a memory strategy of the ith players. Clearly, s 
can be regarded as a map from X into A. Denote by Q the collection of all such bundles 
of strategies s. Write x = (x~ . . . ,xn) for a point in X. 
Definition 1. The pair (s, x) in Q x X is said to be a soluzion of the game with memory 
strategy iff x is a fixed point of the composite map 7~s: X 4 X [i.e., x = V%(X)]. 
Proposition 1 of Sec. 3 in 151 says that x is a stationary point for the dynamics induced 
from the memory strategy s and the averaging process {qT} if x is a fixed point of the 
map ~0s. Therefore, our definition of solutions agrees with that in [51 or in Sec. 1. 
DeJinition 2. A solution (s, x) is called a Nash solution if to each i, xi 2 xi for any 
solution (s’, x’) in Q x X with s; = sj as j # i. In other words, each player cannot 
increase his or her payoff (in the sense of solution) by choosing a different memory 
strategy. 
The concept of a Nash solution can also be localized. Thus, we have 
DeJinition 3. A solution (s, x) is called a local Nash solution if there exists a neigh- 
borhood N of x in X such that to each i, xi 1 xl for any solution (s’, x’) in Q X N with 
s; = sj whenj #i. 
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At the end of this section, we give two additional concepts about solutions which will 
be needed in later sections. 
Assume the payoff r, and the memory strategy s, are of class Cl. Denote by aalaa, 
as/ax the appropriate Jacobian matrices. Set m = m, + m-e + m,. 
Definition 4. Suppose (s, x) is an interior solution in the sense that x, s(x) are interior 
points of X, A in R”, R”‘, respectively. The solution (s, x) is said to be regular if the 
m X m matrix 
$ (x)E (s(x)) - I 
is nonsingular. The solution (s, x) is said to be strongly stable if all the eigenvalues of 
the n x n matrix 
have absolute values less than 1. 
Regular solutions persist under small Cl perturbations (see Sec. 4). If a solution is 
strongly stable, then it is locally stable for the dynamics induced from any averaging 
process (see Sec. 3, Theorem 1 in [5]). 
3. CRITERIA FOR (LOCAL) NASH SOLUTIONS 
A key observation which leads to the research of this paper is the following elementary 
result. Write 7~ = (7r1,. . . ,T,) and a = (a Ir . . . ,a,) for a in A. 
Proposition 1. A pair (s, x) in Q X X is a Nash solution (local Nash solution) iff to 
each i, s(x) maximizes ri(a) subject to sjox(a) = ah for j # i with maximum value xi 
[on a neighborhood U of s(x)]. 
Corollary 1. (a) If (s,x), (s,x’) are two Nash solutions, then x = x’. (b) The set of local 
Nash solutions with given strategy is an isolated set in X. 
Proof of Proposition 1. 
(1) Assume that (s, x) is a Nash solution (local Nash solution). Let a = (a b . . . ,a3 
be any action in (n-‘(N)) such that sjO+@) = aj, for j # i. Choose a memory 
strategy s’ = (s;, . . ., s;) with $(x(a)) = at and sj’ = sj, forj # i. Thus, (s’, da)) 
is a solution. By the definition of a Nash solution (local Nash solution), one has 
ni(a) 5 xi = ri(s(x)), or s(x) possesses the desired property. 
(2) Conversely, let (s ‘, x’) be a solution [in Q x s-l ( V)] with s; = sj for j # i. Set a ’ 
= s’(x)). Thus, s,w(a’) = s;(x’) = a;, for j # i. Therefore, by hypotheses, xi = 
ni(a’) zz ni (s(x)) = Xi. Hence, (s, x) is a Nash solution (local Nash solution). Thus, 
combining (1) and (2), we obtain the proof of Proposition 1. 
Assume now, each A i is a domain with corners in R “‘i, and r, s are functions of class 
C*. Calculus criteria for local Nash solutions are obtained as the Kuhn-Tucker-type 
conditions for the associated optimization problem given in Proposition 1. Therefore, we 
have Theorems 1 and 2 below. Denote by C,,,, the tangent cone of A at s(x). 
THEOREM 1 (first order necessary condition). If (s. x) is a local Nash solution, then to 
each i, there exist Langrangian multipliers &, Ail, . . . ,AiJ not ail zero, with pi 2 0, Ati 
E R”j, hii = 0, such that DL; (v) 5 0 for I’ E Cscx). Here, 
Li = pL;rr,(a) + i hij ’ [Sj”7T(U) - Uj], 
j=l 
and DLi: R” + R is the derivative of Li as a function on A . 
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Dejinition 5. A pair (s, x) is called a crirical Nash solution if it satisfies the conclusion 
of Theorem 1 (i.e., it fulfills the first order necessary condition for a local Nash solution). 
THEOREM 2 (second order sufficient condition). Let (s,x) be a critical Nash solution 
with Lagmngian multipliers pi, AU. If to each i, O*Li(v, v) < 0 for v E C,,,\(O) with 
D(sjor(a) - aj)(v) = 0 for j # i then, (s, x) is a local Nash solution. Here D*Li is the 
second order derivative of Li as a function on A. 
As needed in Sec. 4, we write down the calculus criteria for those interior local Nash 
solutions which are regular (see Definition 4) in matrix notation: 
S&z= $...$ 
1 n 
!~: am, ar, aa,‘. * aa, 
as 
ax= 
Here, awilaa, as,/&, are the Jacobian matrices, and Aij a row vector of dimension ml. 
Thus ariaa, &lax, and A are block matrices. 
At a regular local Nash solution, one can always choose /-Li n Theorem 1 as pi = 1 for 
all i. Therefore, in this situation, Theorem 1 can be phrased as 
THEOREM 1’. Let (.s,x) be an interior local Nash solution which is regular. Then, 
5 (4-4) + A $(x)$(s(x)) -I = 0 
for some A with diag A = 0. Here, diag A = 0 means Ai1 = 0,. . . ,A,, = 0. 
Remark 1. Clearly, 
is nonsingular if 
is nonsingular. In this case, one has 
Nash solutions 
Therefore, our Theorem 1’ is equivalent to Theorem 3 of Sec. 3 in 151. 
Denote by 2 = 
Let 
-_ 
a*771 
aa 
f& 
au* 
-a 
t 
L_ 
a%, 
Bx2 
a*s n 
a2 
_- 
L-l =q=(l+h~)~+t(~)h~(~), 4n 
where '(ariaa), apiaa are regarded as scalars in the above expression (i.e., a block matrix 
with a single block). Write also 
[z - lli 
for the ith row of the block matrix 
asar --- I. 
ax aa 
Using the above notation, one can state Theorem 2 for regular solutions as 
THEOREM 2'. Let (s,x) be an interior critical Nash solution, which is regular, with 
Lagrangian multipliers A. If to each i, qi is negative definite over the subspace 
asa 
[ 3 -- -1 ax aa (v) = 0, ~ 
for j # i. Then, (s, x) is a local Nash solution. 
We conclude this section by a proposition, which enables us to guarantee that a critical 
or local Nash solution is indeed a Nash solution, provided certain convexity hypotheses 
are fulfilled. 
Proposition 2. Assume that each A i is a convex set and each ni is a concave function. 
Let (s, X) be a critical Nash solution having Lagrangian multipliers pi, Au with pi = 1 for 
i,j = l,... .n. Then (s, x) is a Nash solution if hti -sj(n(a)) is concave for all i, j. 
Proof It suffices to show, by Proposition 1, that for each i, Li has a maximum in A 
at S(X). Let a be any element in A and set 1’ = a - s(x). The Taylor Theorem implies 
that 
&(a) - Lf(S(X)) = DLi(S(X))(V) + sLFL;(S(X) + tlV)(V, V). 
for some 8 between 0 and 1. By our hypotheses, DL~(v) 5 0, and D*Ldl’, v) 5 0. Thus 
L{(u) I L&(x)). Therefore, the proof of this proposition is completed. 
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4. GENERIC PAYOFF FUNCTIONS 
Now, we examine the notion of interior local Nash solutions from a generic viewpoint. 
Thus throughout this section, action spaces Ai, A, outcome space X are taken as open 
sets in Rmi R”, and R”, respectively. The main result is Theorem 3. Our approach here 
requires transversality theorems and elementary properties of algebraic sets (or semial- 
gebraic sets cf. [21). To keep the presentation relatively short, proofs of lemmas and 
justifications of remarks are given in the Appendix. 
The payoff function r, the memory strategies {s) studied in this section as assumed 
of class Cti with CL 2 3. C‘(X, A ) denotes the space of all C” memory strategies endowed 
with the Whitney topology. Let ra, sz, 7ra,, and s,, stand for block matrices having the 
same size as that of &r/au, as/&u, a2n/aa2. and a*s/ax” (see Sec. 3). Denote by {(s,, TT,)} 
the Cartesian space consisting of all block matrices s, and 7~~. Similarly, we have (Carte- 
sian) spaces ((4 a, s,)), (6, rQ, sII, TV,)}, etc. 
One should concern mainly with regular solutions, not the singular ones, as the next 
proposition shows. 
Proposition 3. Given any payoff function ?r, set 5?II, = {s E C&(X, A)[ if (s, x) is a 
solution, then it is regular}. Then, ‘21, is open and dense in C&(X, A). For s in ‘LI,,, the 
set {xl(.s, x) is a solution} is isolated in X. 
Proof. Let j”s: X -+ X x A be the zero extension of s defined by j%(x) = (x. s(x)). Set 
F = {(x, a)]x = r(a)}. Clearly, F is a closed submanifold of codimension n. This 
proposition follows from Thorn’s transversality theorem (see [71), and the observation 
that s E ‘?I,, ifj”s transverses to F. 
To get a generic picture of critical Nash solutions via transversality theorem, one 
needs to consider a set 9, in the first jet bundle J’(X, A) = {(x, a, sz)}, which consists 
of the first jet (x, s(x), (as/&r)(x) of all local Nash regular solutions (s, _r). The set 01, 
depending on n, can be described (alternatively) as -lr,-‘(F x ZJ. Here, F = {(x, a)lx = 
r(a)>, Cl = ((sz, rr,)l there exists A such that, diag A = 0, x, + h(s,r, - 1) = 0, and 
szna - 1 is nonsingular}, and the map rr*: J’(X, A) + {(x, a, sz, TV)} is defined by 
n*( VJ,) = (x,0,.b7(a7dad(a)). 
Lemma I. C, is a (semialgebraic) submanifold of codimension tn in {(s, -rr=)}. 
To obtain a nice control of 8,: 
Definirion 6. T is said to have property (G *) if 7r is transversal to the submanifold F 
x Z,. Under this assumption of n, 8, is a closed s:bmanifold of codimension m + n in 
J”‘(X, A) = J’(X, A)\ {(x, a, s&= n(u), sAadaa)(ff) - I is singular). 
By arguments similar to the proof of Thorn’s transversality theorem as in 173, one gets 
that the property (G,) on n is a generic one. By asking rTT* transversal to ((x, u)lx = 
n(u)} x a&, also where a& is the boundary of Z:,, one can indeed conclude that 
Proposition 4. The set {?r f C’(A, X)j z has property (G,)} contains an open and 
dense subset of C&(,4, X). 
Remark 2. T has property (G J if it is a (local) diffeomorphism. 
Our result on critical Nash solutions goes as follows. Let P the parameter space be 
a nonempty open set in Rm. Set 
‘?JuS: = {s E C’@(X x P, AlIs, = s(*, p) E %!I, for each p in P}. 
%?I; is an open but not dense subset in C&(X x P, A). 
Proposition 5. Suppose n has property (G J. Then, there exists an open and dense 
subset 19 in 5%: such that for each s in 8°C. the set L* = ((x, p>i x is a critical Nash 
solution of s,(-) = s(-, p)) is isolated in X x P. 
Proof. To each s in ‘$!I:, letjk s: X x P + Y”(X, A) be the map defined byji s(x, P) 
= (x, sP(x). (&,/ax))@)). Set 0+ = {s E 9I% jk s is transversal to 0,}. A variant of the 
parametrized version of Thorn’s transversality theorem (cf. 17)) implies that 0+@ is both 
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open and dense. The desired property follows from the facts that L* = (&Y)-‘(0,), and 
(ins)-’ is an isolated set. 
Remark 3. If one also considers critical Nash solutions of corank 2 when m = n, i.e., 
rank($$-I) =2. 
Generically, it has codimension 4 + n in X x P. Thus, the set of all critical Nash 
solutions (i.e., including singular ones) has positive dimension in X x P as n > 4 or not 
isolated in X x P. This is an unpleasant fact but true. 
However, I do not know whether a local Nash solution (sp, x) always fullills the second 
order sufficient condition given in Theorem 2’, when s(x, p) lies in the open dense set 6* 
found in Proposition 5. I suspect that it is not valid. To measure the failure of the second 
order conditions via transversality theorem, it sufficies to study a “bad” set 0; in the 
second jet bundle 52(X, A) = {Or, a, sz, s,)}. This set @, which depends on V, can be 
defined as m;t(F x ZZ& Here, 
4i *[Sz~a-‘li 
2.t = {Csz, ma, &,, Gz)l @m Td E 21, = 0, for some i, 1 C i I n}, 
bl~lT--‘li 0 
(for notation, see Theorem 2’). The map r**: JYX, A) + {ti, a, sz, or,, szz, ma,.)} is 
defined by TT~* (x, a, sz, szz) = (x, a, st, (&r/da)(a), .s,=, (hrlaa’)(a)). Denote also by 
C, the set 
{(s,, Wll, szz, %l)l (s.r, na) E W. 
Thus, Z:b2 is contained in x1. 
The next two lemmas justify that @ is indeed the desired “bad” set. Let Q be a 
m xmmatrixandHam xrmatrixofrankr. 
Lemma 2. The quadratic form *vQv of v in R” is degenerate on Hv = 0, iff 
/E ‘;I = 0. 
Lemma 3. Zp is a (semi-)algebraic set closed in Z,. 2! has codimension greater than m 
in {s,, nr.7 sz5, 7fNJ). 
To get a nice control of eb,, we require 
Dejinition 7. n is said to possess properly (Gz) if 7~** are transversal to both sets F 
x C1,F x Z. Clearly, under this hypothesis on 7~, 0, -2 r;:(F x 2:) is a closed set of 
codimension greater than m + n in J@‘(X, A), and @ = r---(F x q) is a closed set of 
codimension greater than m + n in Y2’(X, A). Here, f2’(X, A) = _F”(X, A) x {stt}. 
Using arguments analogous to the proof of Proposition 4, we get 
Proposition 5. The set {n E Cp(.4, X)lr has property (GJ} contains an open and 
dense subset of C“(4, X). 
Now, we are ready to present our main generic result on local Nash solutions (regular). 
Recall that for s = s(x, p) in CF(X. x P, A), s,(x) = s(x, p). 
THEOREM 3. Assume that 7r possesses property (G2). Then, there exists an open and 
dense subset 0 in ?I: such that, to each s = s(&, p) in I??, one has 
s, i;i ;he set + = {(x, p)J( x) is a local Nash solution} is isolated in X x P. 
s, x) is a local Nash solution, then it satisfies the strong second order sufficient 
condition as given in Theorem 2’. 
Proof: To each s in ‘?I:, let j;s: X x P + J@‘(X, A) be the map defined byj&(x, p) 
= (&s(x, p), (a2s18x2)(x)). Set 0 = {s E %:I jis are transversal to both 0, and 0:). By 
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(a variant of) the parametrized Thorn’s transversality theorem, one concludes that 0‘ is 
both open and dense in ‘!?I:. Assertion (1) follows from the facts L C (iis)-‘(0,) and 
(j$)-‘(9,) is an isolated set. For cod@ > m + n, jks being transversal to @ simply 
means that (jis)-‘(9:) = 0. Assertion (2) follows from this fact. Hence, the proof of 
Theorem 3 is completed. 
Remark 4. If rr is a (local) diffeomorphism, although in may not have the (G J property, 
the conclusion of Theorem 3 remains valid. 
One can also conclude a discussion relating to local validity of local Nash solutions in 
the above setting. Set 
c = {(SE? ~TT,)l&z~TT,) l-l {Z E (21 IZI = l} # 0>, 
here (+(s~T~) denotes the spectrum of the m x m matrix SAUTE rf? the complex plane. The 
set C is a closed semialgebraic set. 
Lemma 4. C fl 2, is a semialgebraic set of codimension L 1 in Z1. 
Thus, by making further transversality condition on r, one can prove as before that 
hyperbolic nondegenerate local Nash solutions occur generically as isolated sets in m- 
parameter families of strategies. For the precise formulation of this statement and its 
proof, we leave that to the interested reader. 
There is no reason why interior Nash solutions have to be a Pareto optimal. One can 
actually see this by the first order considerations. In other words, critical Nash solutions 
(s, x), in which S(X) is a regular point of r [i.e., DT is a submersion of s(x)], occur 
generically in m-parameter families of strategies. As before, it sufficies to have 
Lemma 5. Denote by D the algbraic set {(So ra)(rTT, is singular}. Then, D II Xl is a 
semialgebraic set of codimension 2 1 in 2,. 
This completes our studies about generic properties of Nash solutions for a game with 
memory strategies. 
5. THE VALUES OF NASH SOLUTIONS 
First, we show that the noncooperative solutions of a game with memory have 
“cooperative” outcomes. A message common to repeated games with complete infor- 
mation (cf. [II). 
To each i, let cii = (at.. .,Lz~_~, u~+~. .,a,) be the variable in A1 x .** x Aibl x Ar+1 
X *.a X A, = Ai. Write Pi(Ur* 6,) for 7rr(at . . . ,a,) as there is no danger of confusion to 
do so here. Assume that the action spaces A i are compact. Set 
Xi = max me 7ri( at 9 iif) 
ai 
F?= min max (a,, &). 
I aI 
One always has Xi 5 $. Thus, Xi is the maximum level of payoff which player i can 
assure himself. ?r is the level of payoff below which play i cannot be forced by the 
remaining players, but he cannot necessarily guarantee himself this payoff. 
THEOREM 4. Suppose that all action spaces A ,, are compact and convex. Then, 
(a) r(A) O {(x1, . . . ,x,] xf 2 xi for all i} # 0 
(b) xi 2 xifor all i, for any Nash solution (s, X) of the game r: A +X. 
(c) Xi zz Xir, when there is a continuous function 41: Ai *A i such that 
Tri(+*(&), &) = fTlaX7rf(Ui, (if) 
ai 
for all cii. 
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Proof. (a) let UP maximize the function 
Thus, 
Set a0 = (at . . . ,a:), one has 
77f(a”) 2 min ni(Uy, 6,) = Xi. 
4 
Thus, ‘rr@) n {till - . .,X.)1 Xi 2 F* for all i} # 0. ’ 
(b) To each a?, by Brouwer fixed theorem, there exists a”? = 
(a?, - - . gT_l,ajt++b . . . ,a,*) such that sj(?r(a*)) = af forj # i, where a* = (a:, . . . p,*). If 
(s, x) is a Nash solution, by Proposition 1, Xi 2 mi(a*). 
implies 
If ai* is arbitrary, one has 
(c) By Brouwer fixed point theorem, one finds a point a”? = (a:, . . . ,&-I, 
aL . . . ,a:) in A i such that sj(n(a*)) = af for j # i, where 
a*=(@.... 9&l, dJi(fiT), d-1,. . . 94). 
(s, X) is a Nash solution, by Proposition 1, xi 1 ri(&(hi*), &). For 
?ri(+(&T), ;I?) = max ?Ti(ai, &T) 5 min max Tr(U*, 639 
Qi h, ai 
one obtains 
Combining parts (a), (b), (c) the proof of this theorem is finished. 
Now from assertions (a), (b) it seems natural to ask that given any x in ~64) n {X E 
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XI xi 2 Xi for all i}, does there exist a Nash solution (s, X) for the game V: A + X? For 
the continuous prisoner’s dilemma, the answer is affirmative. We will prove this fact in 
the next section. However, in general, the answer can be negative. Indeed, we find a 
game with two players such that no Nash solution exists at all. 
THEOREM 5. The two person game, with action spaces A 1 = A 2 = [ - 1, 11; payoff 
function 7r1(ull u2) = (a1 + 1 a#, T&I,, az) = -($ aI + u.J*, has no Nash solution (s, x). 
Proof Assume that the two person game has a Nash solution (s, x). 
(a) Claim that x1 I ib. For &(ul) = -1 aI, 
by assertion (c) of Theorem 4, one has 
x2 2 min max 7r2(a1, u2) = 0. 
a1 a, 
7r2 I 0 implies x2 = 0 or $ S&X) + s*(x) = 0. Therefore, x1 = 7r1(s(r)) = (sl(x) + 3 s&))” 
= s:(X)[l - $1’ 5 #. 
(b) Show that xl 1 1. Denote by &: A 2 + A 1 the map defined by 
444 { 1 (12 2 0 = 
-1 u* c 0. 
Clearly, ~@,(a& a3 2 1 for any u2 in A *. Observe that the map u2 --, s2(~(&(u2), uo)) 
on A2 is continuous despite the fact that the map & is not. By Brouwer fixed point 
theorem, one has a fixed point, say a#. Let at = &(a$), then s2(7r(u?, ~2)) = uz*. 
By Proposition 1, one has x1 2: ~~(a:, a#)= rr,(41(up), a$)~ 1. 
Combining (a), (b), one concludes that no Nash solution can exist, and the proof of 
Theorem 5 is completed. 
Remark 5. An outcome x is called feasible if x belongs to the convext hull of T(A). 
It is called individually rational if x1 2 2 for all i. The “double fold” game given by 
Theorem 5 is also a game which has no feasible individually rational payoffs. The reader 
may convince himself by observing that (1) XT = 1, y$ = 0 and 
(2) T (A) n {(x,, ~4x2 = 0) = {(x,, O)( 0 s x1 sg, }. 
As a consequence, by Theorem 1 in [ 11, no Nash equilibrium points exist for the super- 
game associated to the “double fold” game. 
6. CONTINUOUS PRISONER’S DILEMMA WITH MEMORY STRATEGIES 
A two person game which is the mixed extension of the ordinary prisoner’s dilemma, 
will be studied in detail here (see [3,5]). This game, called a continuous prisoner’s di- 
lemma, has action spaces Al = A2 = 10, 11 and payoff functions rl(al, a2) = U, - 2~~ + 
2, r2(u1, ad = -2~ + a2 + 2. Clearly, r is a linear diffeomorphism (see Fig. 1). 
Thus, the outcome space X can be taken as the parallelogram with vertices (1, l), 
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(3, 0), (2, 2), and (0, 3). In analyzing this game, we like to denote the outcomes by G) 
and memory strategies for the first and second plavers by 4 and +, respectively. 
Using rr as a transformation, Proposition 1 can be rephrased: [($), ($)I is a Nash 
solution iff x has a maximum value at ($) subject to +(3 = (7r-l)&) = - 3 x - $ y + 2, 
(y”) E X, and y has a maximum value at ($) subject to 4e) = (?r-‘), (=) = - 4 x - 3 y + 2, 
(y”) E X. Here, 
(701 
[ 1 (702 
stands for the inverse of (73. Furthermore, the Lagrangian functions L, in Theorems 1 
and 2 can be written as L, = plx + h,,(lJI + 3 x + S y - 2) and Ls = by + Asl(+ + 4 x 
+sy - 2). 
We label our findings about the continuous prisoner’s dilemma by (A) through (H). 
Proofs when omitted, will be given in the Appendix. 
(A) Let G) be an interior point of X. Then [($‘) e)] is a critical Nash solution iff 
Jly + 4 = 0. 4= + B = 0 at that point. Applying Definition 5 in (x, y) coordinates, one 
gets, for some CL~, cc2, AX2, AZ1 
IL1 + b,(dJz + 9 = 0 I4 + P2&#Jlr + 3) = 0 
with Al2 # 0, with A2, # 0. 
A12CJlu + $1 = 0 A21(4cr + 5) = 0 
Clearly, these equations are equivalent to Jly + 5 = 0, 4, + 1 = 0. 
(B) Let 16% (:)I be an interior critical Nash solution. Assume, for simplicity in dicus- 
sion, that GL, + % > 0, 4# + P > 0 at (;). If +,,, > 0 and 4== > 0 at (3, then it is a local 
Nash solution. If 4, a,b are convex functions in x, y, then it is a Nash solution. 
Let, pl, A12, p2, A2, be a Lagrangian vector at (3. From p. + A,2($1 + 5) = 0, A,2 # 
0, and +I + % > 0, one must have p. > 0, Al2 < 0. Thus, we can take ~~ = 1 and L, = 
x + A&+ + 3 x + 4 y - 2) with Al2 < 0. Let v = (vt v2) # (0, 0) be a vector such that 
D(G + % x + 5 Y - 2)(v) = 0. For D(I,!J + S x + $ y - 2)(v) = (IJ?= + 3)vl + (&, + 9v2 
= ($J~ + 3))~~ = 0 at (z):), one must have v 1 = 0, and v2 # 0. D2L1+) = A12D2$(v) = A1202$ 
(0, v2) = A12JIUII(~2)2 < 0. Similarly, one has D2L2(w) < 0 for D(4 + !X x + 4 y - 2)(w) = 
0, w # 0. By Theorem in 2 (x, y) coordinates, we conclude that [(g), (=)I is a local Nash 
solution. 
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Observe that p1 = ~(2 = 1, hlz < 0, AZ1 <O and in is linear. Thus, if 4, JI are convex 
functions in X, y, Proposition 2 can be applied, and we assume that I($), (E)l is a Nash 
solution. 
(C) Since r is a diffeomorphism, by Theorem 3 or more accurately by Remark 4, we 
know that generically, regular, interior local Nash solutions occur as isolated sets in 
2-parameter families of memory strategies, and they fulfill the second order sufficient 
criteria as given in Theorem 2’. 
(D) Assume again that $J~ + 5 > 0. $, + S > 0, at an interior critical Nash solution 
($), (3. Then, this solution is strongly stable (see Definition 4) when 4, < 0, and JIz < 
0 at that point (3. 
The proof requires the following lemma: 
Lemmu 6 (see p. 436) in [4]). The question A* + alh + a2 = 0 has two roots al, a2 
with jar/, la21 < 1 iff 
l-a,>0 
1+a,+a,>o 
1 - a, + u2 > 0. 
We leave the details in the Appendix. 
(E) Let us restrict our memory strategies to linear ones for a moment. In other words, 
the strategies now have the form 
$=ux+by+e 
q!~= CC+ dy+f’ 
Notice the payoff function r is also linear. Thus, a critical Nash solution is really a Nash 
solution, and there is no distinction between the local stability and the global stability for 
a solution. 
Proposition 6. The outcome (3 is a value for some Nash solution with linear memory 
strategy iff 1 I x 5 2, and 1 I y 5 2. Furthermore, the Nash solution with value ($) can 
indeed be chosen to be globally stable (Proof. See Appendix). 
Interior Nash solutions with linear strategies (for the continuous prisoner’s dilemma) 
have an unpleasant feature. Namely, they are unprotected. A Nash solution is said to be 
unprotected, if one of the players can decrease the outcome of the other, by choosing a 
different strategy without changing his or her own outcome. To see this in a neat way, 
I prefer to give a simple lemma first. 
Lemma 7. Let F = {(x, y)( I/J = - $ x - + y + 2). Suppose [(g), ($;)I is a solution and 
($) in X. Then, there exists a strategy +* such that [($*), ($) is a solution iff ($ 
E F. 
Now, if [($), @)I is an interior Nash solution, x has a maximum value on F. Thus, F 
must be a vertical segment, and there exists y$ c y, with ($) in F. By Lemma 7, we 
know that l(g), ($)I is unprotected. 
The bad behavior about linear strategies gives one reason why one needs to study 
nonlinear strategies (at least for the interior solutions). 
(F) The values of Nash solutions for the continuous prisoner’s dilemma are determined 
here as we promised in Sec. 5. 
THEOREM 6. (3 in X is a value of some Nash solution for the continuous prisoner’s 
dilemma iff x 2 1, and y 2 1. Furthermore, globally stable Nash solutions can always 
be chosen, and they are also protected when x > 1, y > 1 or x = 1, y = 1. 
Nash solutions 13 
Easy computations show that X = X* = 1, and y = y* = 1. Thus, for any Nash solution 
(($), (a), by Theorem 4, one has x 2 1 and J’ -> 1. For the other part of the theorem, see 
Appendix. 
(G) The Pareto outcome (‘2) should be considered as the “best” cooperative outcome 
according to the fairness of the game. By (E) and (F), we know that(f) can be the outcome 
of some Nash solutions. Can one find a class of strategies, called “good” strategies for 
each player such that when both players choose their good strategies, a Nash solution 
with outcome (f) results? Our answer to this problem is the following, we restrict to linear 
memory strategies first. 
DeJinirion 8. A linear memory strategy 4: X 4 A 1 for the first player: X + A 1 is said 
tobegoodif~=a(x-2)+66-2)witha~-5,-1<a+6,and-5<a-b(see 
Fig. 2). Similarly, a linear memory strategy +I: X + A 2 for the second player is said to 
be good if I/J = C(X -2)+dO,-2)withd<-9,-l<c+d,and-$<d-c. 
The requirement that d(X) C A 1, in our case, amounts to an additional condition: 
0 5 a - 2b (see Fig. 2). One does not have to write down the condition - 5 < a - b, 
for a - b = 3 (a - 2b) + 5 (a + b) > - f. 
The condition - 1 C c1 + b means the “good” strategy is played more on the easy side 
(i.e., al = 0) for one has+ < 4 (3,s) = a 8 - 2) + b@ - 2). The segment E = {k, y) E 
XI 4 = - 4 x - 3 y + 2) must meet the side from (1,l) to (0,3), and its slope - (a+*)/ 
(b+$) d 1. Let ($), (G:) be any solution with (GE) # 0, then ($) E E or 
y*-2=- sfr - 2). 
The first player would like - (a +h)/(b +3) > 0, which means if the second player increases 
his outcome by choosing a different strategy $, then the outcome of the first player also 
increases at the same time. One cannot have a + B > 0, for then 0 < - (u+5)/(6+8) 5 
1, implies a + f 5 - (b + S), which contradicts the pr&vious condition - 1 < a + b. 
Therefore, one gets a + !8 < 0. 
good strategy 
/ 
1 --=a-b 
3 
/, 
a=2b=O 
a 
- 1 =a+b 
Fig. 2. 
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THEOREM 7. Suppose both players choose their “good” strategies 4 and $. Then 
(($), (2;)) is a Nash solution which is globally stable and protected. 
Proof. (a) To see that (2) is indeed a protected Nash solution, by Proposition 1, Lemma 
7, and symmetry, it suffices to show that x has a maximum value 2 along 9 = - 5 x - 
3 y + 2 or (c + 3)(x - 2) + (d + $)(y - 2) = 0 only at (3. This is clear, for 
Y-2=-&$ c+s (x - 2) 
with - (c+%)l(d+$) > 0. 
(b) One obtains the global stability, by showing that the matrix 
has all its eigenvalues < 1 in absolute value. Details will be given in the Appendix. 
(H) Finally, we would like to extend the class of “good” linear strategy so that it also 
includes nonlinear ones. 
Definition 9. A strategy 4: X +A 1 of class C’ for the first player is said to be “good” 
if~(2,2)=Oand~,<-9,-1~+,++,, - $ < 4, - &, on X. Similarly, one also has 
the “good” strategy for the second player. 
THEOREM 7. When both players choose their good strategy (,“), then, (($), (3)) is a 
Nash solution which is globally stable and protected. 
Basically, the proof of Theorem 7’ is a refinement of Theorem 7 and is left in the 
Appendix. 
APPENDIX 
(1) Proof of Lemma 1. It suffices to show that the function A = rr,(l - szr&’ is 
surjective on 2,. For &t, + GX(s,r, - 1) + X(Gs,n, + s&r,) = 0, where &rTT., 6A, 
and as, are variation vectors. Let 8s, = 0, one has 6A(l - sIra) = (1 + As&r,. Ob- 
serve that (1 + As&l - ~F,s,) = 1 - 1~~ + A(s,rr, - l>ls, = 1. Hence, 6~, = 
(1 - x,s,)6A(l - s,~,) or A is sutjective. Thus, the proof of Lemma 1 is finished. 
(2) Justification of Remark 2. rTT* has property (G 1) iff the map pu : {(u, sz)} + 
{(s n T,)} defined by p* (a, s3 = (sr, (arrl~3a)(u)), is transversal to 2,. Thus, it suffices 
to prove that, to each u, the map sz --, A(?r,(u, ~3) is a submersion. This follows from 
the observation 6X( 1 - sE7rO) = ASs,7r, = ~~(1 - ~,7r~)-%~r~ (for &r, = 0) or as, = 
(1 - s,7r,)~,%A(l - sI~&r,‘. 
(3) Proof of Lemma 2. Let Ao = v (change of coordinates). For 
one has 
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Thus, the condition 
is invariant under linear change of coordinates. Take H as I = (I,, 0). In this case 
where QE is the quadratic form on Ev = 0. Hence, it is degenerate iff 1 QEI = 0 or 
This completes the proof of Lemma 2. 
(4) Proof of Lemma 3. It suffices to show that to each (sn 7rr,) E 2, the algebraic set 
is Proper in {(h, n&l. Let a, . . . ,qn be all negative-definite forms on R"', . . . ,Rmm. 
Define &-, as (1 + As,)-‘[q - %r&z~rr,l (recall (1 + As,)-’ = 1 - w,). Clearly, 
(S&V w&) e B . Thus, we finish the proof of Lemma 3. 
(5) Justification of Remark 4. It is enough to observe the following: 
(a) If T has (G1) property, 8, is a submanifold of codimension m + n. 
(b) Set 6 = {s E YIpI ji s is transversal to 0,}, and 19 = {s E QI jis(X x P) f~ 
8 ! = 0 }. 6 is dense in BP, 19 is open in 5?Ip. 
(c) For s E bi, local solutions are isolated in X x P, which are “stable” under 
small perturbations. 
(d) Adding small sz3. terms to degenerate local Nash solutions in 6 if necessary, 
one concludes 6 is dense. 
(6) Proof of Lemma 4. The map ((s,, rr,)l s,a, - 1 is nonsingular} -+ {(So, A)} defined 
by (s> rTT.) + (sn A) = (ss, ~~(1 - SITE)-‘) is a submersion. Hence, the restriction p: X1 
+ {(sz, A)/ diag A = 0) is also a submersion. For (1 + s,A) = (1 - sznT,)-‘, one has 
1 + 2 s,A = (1 + s,~~)(l - s,~~)-‘. Hence, C=p-l(K), where K = {(sz, A)[ diag A = 0, 
Re(s& fl {- 1} # 0). It remains to prove that K is a (semialgebraic) set of positive 
codimension in {(s,, A)] diag A = O}. Let ker(sA) @ I be an invariant decomposition of 
sa. Denote by n: R" ---, R* a linear map such that voh = 1 on I. Define (~3, = sz + 
ET. It is not hard to see that all the nonzero eigenvalues of s,A change their real parts by 
E. Hence, K has positive codimension in { (sr, A)[ diag A = 0} and the proof of Lemma 
4 is completed. 
(7) Proof of Lemma 5. Consider the submersion 
A = T~(s,~T, - I)-‘: Xl + {Al diag A = O}. 
The set D* of singular matrix A in {Al diag A = 0} is clearly a proper algebraic subset in 
{AI diag A = O}. The lemma follows by the fact that D n X1 = A-‘@ *). 
(8) Proof in (D). The characteristic polynomial of the matrix 
(4 -:) (;J 2) isAZ+(2~,+2~,+%)A+(3~&,,-5)=0. 
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By Lemma 6, one needs to show 
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4 + 2JI, + 24, + 3+,9, > 0 or (4, + $1 (4~~ + 4) > 0, 
-29s - 24%+ 3AlG1,‘O 
which is clear by our assumption. 
(9) Proof of Proposition 6. Let ($), (2) be a Nash solution. Then, x has maximum 
value x0 on r(N2), where NZ = {(al, u2) E A 1 x A*, +(~(a)) = az}. One must have 1 I 
x0 5 2 or (2) lies on the segment between points (1, 1) and (3, 0). Otherwise, Nz is a line 
segment connecting the side a, = 0 to the side a1 = 1 in [O, 11 x [O, 11. [Here, one needs 
to observe that, by fixed point theorem, to each a 11 there exists u2 such that (al, u2) E 
N2).l Thus, 7r(N2) is a line segment connecting the side (0, 3) to (2, 2) and the side from 
(1) 1) to (3, 0) in the parallelogram X. For x0 C 1 or x0 > 2, 7r(N2) cannot be vertical and 
indeed has a negative slope. If Q) does not lie on the segment between (1, 1) and 
(3, 0), x can increase its value along 7r(N2) which is absurd. Similarly, one also has 1 5 
y, 5 2 or (2) on the segment between (1, 1) and (0,3). Consequently, 1 I x0 5 2, and 1 
5 yo 5 2. 
Conversely, let 1 5 x0 5 2, 1 5 y, I 2, the inverse image of the line segment x = x0 
in X under rr is the graph of the function u2 = /(a,) = h (ai + 2 - x0). Define JI = I((r%) 
= - B - f y + [2 - (x0/2)]. Similarly, set $J = - 3x - by + [ 2 -(~~/2)1.(($),($.)) is a 
critical Nash solution, thus, a Nash solution. By direct computations or by (D), we know 
that the solution obtained is indeed global stable. 
(10) Part of the proof of Theorem 6. Let x0 1 1, y, z 1. Set (a:, a$) = ?r-‘(x0, yo). 
Define g = lt f l (ui - ufy on Ai, where f,(ui) = 1 (ai + 2 - x0) and 0 C E C f. The 
function g has the following properties: 
(i) it has a Lipschitz constant it + 2~ < 1, 
(ii) g(uy) = /(a?) and g* 5 1 on Ai. 
Since g(A,) may not lie in AZ = 10, 11, we modify g by letting g* = min[l, max 
(0, g)]. Indeed, g* has the following forms: 
. max(0, g) for small E > 0, if x0 12 
g* = 
; i 
g for small E > 0, if 1 C x0 5 2. 
min(l, g) for smalle > 0, ifxo = 1 
The function g* enjoys the same properties (i), (ii) as that of g, and we call them as 
properties (i)*, (ii)* of the function g*. For ~~(a i, u2) = x0 iff a2 = /i(u3, the property 
(ii)* of g* implies (iii)* (at a$) maximizes rl(ut uz) subject to u2 = g*(ul), (aI, u2) E A 1 
x AZ. 
Now, set I/J = g*(7rR-‘)1_ Similarly, by symmetry, set 4 = h*(.rr-‘)a where 
h* = minll, max(O, h)], 
h = 12 + E(UZ - uD2, 
12 = &(a1 + 2 - Yo). 
Claim that (($), ($)) is a Nash solution with the desired property. 
For, + = g*(-rr-%, one gets I,!Jo~(u~ u2) = u2 iff u2 = g*(u& Combining this fact with 
(iii)* of g*, one obtains that (at aa maximizes rl(uIr u2) subject to $(~(a~ u2)) = a, 
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(a= a*) E A1 x A*. Similarly, (ai aa maximizes rz(al, a*) subject to +(7r(a1, az)) = ul, 
(al, uz) E A 1 x AZ. Thus, by Proposition 1, we know that <@, ($)) is a Nash Solution. 
The Nash solutions, which we just construct, are protected, when x0 > 1, y. > 1 or 
xo = 1, YO = 1. By symmetry, it suffices to show that if( ($*>(#> is a solution withy8 5 
yo, then y$ = yo. For 7r1(u:, a$) = ~~(a:, a$!) = x0, (a?, uf) maximizes ml subject to 
$(r(ul, uz)) = u2 or u2 = g*(ul) for (a,, u2) in Al x At. For our construction of g*, we 
have g* > I on 10, ll\{ut} when x0 > 1, y, > 1, or X& y, = 1. Thus, (a:, a$) = 
(4 4 and Y o* = r2(aT, a!!) =__yg.~__ 
It remains to show that the Nash solutions, which we have, are global stable. It suffices 
to prove that the map S = ($)o?T on A 1 x AZ is a contraction map. For 4 = (h*)(~~)~, 
4~ = (g*)(n%, S(u, uz) = (h*(uz), g*(ul)). For g*, h* has Lipschitz constant 1 + 2~ < 
1 [by @*I, 
tf %I, ~2) - WG, 4) It = [@*(a,) - h*(a’2))2 + k*(ad - g*@;)W* 
s 6 + 2E) II (al, 6) - (49 4 II * 
Thus S is a contraction map on Al x A2. 
Thus the proof of Theorem 6 is completed. 
(11) Completion of the proof of Theorem 7 left in (b). The matrix 
(4 -f)(: 4 
has the characteristic polynomial A2 - (a + d - 2b - 2c) A + 3(bc - ad) = 0. By 
Lemma 6. one needs to check 
1 > 3 (bc - ad) 
1 + 3(bc - ad) > a + d - 2b - 2c or 3(b + 3)(c + %) > 3(-a - 5)(-d - 4). 
1+3(bc-ud)>-(u+d-2b-2c)or3(3-b)~-~)>3(~-a)~-d) 
The inequalities follow from our hypotheses easily. 
(12) Proof of Theorem 7’. 
(a) Set Nl = {(al, a2)l+h7(at a2)) = aLI, 
$ (dJCI(da 19%)) - 4) = -21L, + 4% - 1 = 2(-$2 - & - 1) + 3(& + 4) < 0, 
1 
by hypotheses, N, is a one-dimensional closed submanifold, and each connected com- 
ponent can be represented as the graph of some function from A 1 to A 2. Along II(N 1), 
the slope of the tangent line is given by - (+,+3)/(&+$), which is positive by hypotheses. 
This fact together with geometric considerations, one can conclude that x attains its 
maximum value on II(N ,) = {+ = - b x - % y + 2) only at @. A similar statement holds 
for $J also. Thus, by Proposition 1 and Lemma 7, (($), G)) is a protected Nash solution. 
(b) Let 
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We get that TO($) has a globally attracting fixed point (i) by showing 
for some c, with 0 C c < 1. Here 
blmar = I(vO:)lmx = mNlv,l, 1~21) 
denotes the maximum norm on R2. Set 
c = yEg maxC-& - b, -+z - I(lY, - 3(6, - 44, -3(&I - +I,>>. 
U 
By our hypotheses, it follows 0 < c C 1. Let (:g E R2, and notice -24, + & > 0. 
I&! - WLJV, + t-24, + blJv2l 
5(-W= + 4Jlv21 + 14, - .wlhI 
SN-24, + 43 + I& - w,11l4mx 
= [-G#b + 44 or -3(& - 4Jlb~l~~ 
=44lW 
Similarly, I(& - 2J13Vl + (-2JIz + JlYh21 5 44nax. 
Therefore, I AvI,, c cbl,,,,. 
Combining (a) and (b), the proof of Theorem 7’ is completed. 
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